Ukraine vs. Russia-Technological Impact on the Future of War.

In the history of warfare, one mostly sees wars that use existing technology and whose outcomes are impacted by numbers of troops, quality of leadership, political context, or even simply technological superiority of one side over the other. Wars such as Korea, Vietnam, First Gulf War, Afghanistan, the Iraq War, the 6-Day War, and others played out how they did and ended with methods of fighting wars minimally impacted. While there might be a couple of technological advances (such as loitering munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, aka drones that fire missiles), the sense that future wars will largely look similar to past wars remained intact.

However, there are other wars that end up significantly impacting how wars are fought. Technology that is used and developed in that war end up looking very different than what came before. World War I was just such a war. While technology such as airplanes and submarines had existed prior to that war, the extensive use of these items, as well as the development of the battle tank (also machine guns and barbed wire) meant that the future wars would be fought differently and require development of new tactics both to effectively use these weapons as well as effectively defend against their use.

The Ukraine War appear to possibly be just such a war. Prior to this war, there were drones, there were air defense systems against airplanes, and missile defense systems. However, these weapons have never been used to such an extent as they have been in this war.  In the case of air defense systems, at various times during the conflict, Ukraine’s network of air defense missiles appears to have made it nearly impossible for manned Russian aircraft to operate within Ukrainian airspace, forcing the Russians fire their long-range, aircraft-carried missiles from the safety of Russian airspace thereby often reducing their range and effectiveness. In addition, the war has witnessed both Russians and Ukrainians using electronic warfare systems and missiles to shoot down incoming missiles and drones launched by the other side. As the war has gone on, tactics and counter-tactics have evolved as each side has attempted to improve upon the effectiveness of its own strikes and degrade the effectiveness of the other side’s strikes.

However, probably the most extensive impact on the future of war has been the development of drones on the battlefield. Drones of various types have become extremely cheap to produce, and are now blanketing the battlefield. Some drones have been developed that can be used as kamikazes against tanks and other armored vehicles. FPV (First Person View) drones loaded with explosives have been able to be steered into tanks and disable/destroy them. Even if the tank is not destroyed by the first drone, hitting it with 3 or 4 cheaply produced drones can be effective at a much lower cost and with more precision than other anti-tank weapons.

Included in the array of battlefield game changers is the use of the small, cheaply produced reconnaissance drone. Since time immemorial, the surprise attack with massive number of troops and materiel has been a staple tactic. The massive use of cheap, commercially available drones has essentially eliminated this as a possibility. To be sure, the possibility of a surprise attack by a small unit attempting take a given position is still possible. But the massing of several hundred tanks for a major offensive reminiscent of the Germans in WWII, the 6-Day and Yom Kippur wars, or the U.S. in both Gulf Wars is not something that can done, except possibly in the context of a country that is overwhelmingly more powerful than another, such as maybe Russia vs Estonia (leaving aside the implications of an attack on a NATO), or one that did not have effective defenses built out. Not only would the gathering of materiel on this scale be spotted immediately, but the drones would be able to attack and damage/disrupt the armored columns themselves, as well as increasing the precision of artillery strikes on the particular column and its logistical support systems.

In Ukraine today, Russian tactics have evolved to where they are moving small numbers of troops on ATVs, motorcycles, and other small & fast transportation methods to attack local positions and avoid the drones. In other cases, there are reports of soldiers on both sides using drones to deliver hand grenades, or even resorting to shotguns to try and shoot down the other sides’ low flying drones. At the same time, both sides are employing electronic warfare systems to try and disable the other side’s drones.

In short, the technologically advanced, cheaply produced drone has significantly impacted the battlefield. Not only are Russian and Ukrainian forces using kamikaze drones to attack strategic targets far in the rear such as power plants and military installations, but they have turned the battlefield into a space in which there is no place to really hide. Tactics are still being developed to use these assets both offensively and defensively; lessons that will likely turn into drone attack and drone defense doctrines at some point in the future. And the cheapness of these systems, while not always a full substitute for more expensive systems such as artillery or aircraft, has shifted the balance of combat power more in the direction of smaller countries that may lack the budget for bigger systems. And likely the biggest endorsement of these systems is the fact that while Russia is advancing (albeit very slowly) and Ukraine is facing manpower shortages and other challenges, the fact is that Ukraine has been able to use these systems to fill some of the gaps that they have, increase the effectiveness of their systems (such as artillery), and deny the Russians the ability to mass tanks for an attack that would achieve a breakthrough.

In short, without these systems, the war would now likely be in a very different place; specifically, to Russia’s advantage. And in the future, many wars will look very different than they would have if they had been fought prior to 2022.