Four Years Of War

Another February has arrived, and with it the anniversary of 4 years since the Russian invasion. The invasion, far from being the quick Russian victory that many analysts expected, is permanently altering the geopolitical landscape in ways that are still unclear (and likely won’t be for many years). There are many things that have been observed and many things that we have learned (and are continuing to learn) a few of which are as follows:

1.)    The Russian military isn’t as strong as it seemed.

Although certain sources like to tout the alleged strength of the Russian military, the fact is that after 4 years of war, the goal of the war which appears to be the destruction of Ukraine as an independent state has not happened. After a rapid initial advance, the Russians discovered that their logistical systems and tactical sophistication were inadequate to sustain a rapid armored advance. This and the fact that they invaded Ukraine with far too few troops meant that the quick completion of the mission was not going to happen.

While there was significant movement in the first year of the war, the last 3 years of the war have been a sort of grinding attrition more reminiscent of World War I than the mass movement of the World War II. Although the Russians have made advances over the last 3 years, these have been slow and very costly. In addition, the Russian Navy has been effectively evicted from the western Black Sea by a country that doesn’t even have navy.

Although it is possible that Russia could still conceivably “win”, that possibility seems a lot further in the future than it did four years ago.

2.)    But it is not as weak as it appeared.

After the initial phase of the war, Russia was forced to evacuate rather abruptly large swaths of territory that it had taken as the initial Ukrainian counterattack broke through the Russian lines which were inadequately manned in several places. At this point, many western observers wrote off the Russian military as joke, convinced that a Ukrainian victory was just around the corner. The western-trained Ukrainian army with its flexible tactics was going to run circles around the remaining Russian forces in Ukraine. This is not what happened. The much-touted big Ukrainian counterattack that came in the first part of 2023 that was supposed to drive through to the southern coast, split the Russian lines and effectively cut off large numbers of troops, didn’t. The Russians managed to stabilize their defensive lines and the offensive can be said to have failed. Apart from the sudden offensive into the Kursk Oblast in the summer of 2024; something that was of questionable strategic value, the initiative on the battlefield has remained with Russia. Russia has also proven that at certain times it can overwhelm Ukrainian missile and drone defenses, even if these have not had a strategic impact on the war as of yet

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3.)    Drones have transformed the modern battlefield.

The cheapness of the drone as well technological developments have made mass movement of tanks, armored vehicles, and masses of men much harder to pull off. Throughout the war, drones have become smaller, and more adept at avoiding countermeasures. The large drones with missiles and cameras that can loiter over the battlefield like what existed for the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan still play a role. However, there is sort of an arms race as the Ukraine (and the West) look to produce masses of drones that can avoid Russian countermeasures, and Russia (along with China) looks to do the same. One Russian innovation was to create low flying drones that could be steered by kilometers long fiber-optic cables to get around Ukrainian jamming technology. One countermeasure to some of these innovations is to shoot down the low flying drones with shotguns, as if they were birds. Regardless, camera drones and suicide drones are no longer reserved for great powers with large budgets, and the sheer volume of cheaper drones means that a weaker opponent will be able hamper offensive actions by a stronger one.

4.)    The West has trouble understanding the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy.

At the beginning of the war, the West launched sanctions believing that it would cripple the Russian economy, starve the Russian military of funding, and force Putin to withdraw either due to lack of funds or worries that the Russians would rise up and overthrow him. This clearly has not happened. In addition, there doesn’t appear to be any indication that it will. The reason that the West has been disappointed is partly due to the fact that the initial sanctions were too timid. As of this writing, the EU has launched 19 rounds of sanctions against Russia. One can be forgiven for asking why there were 19 rounds. Why not impose all of these sanctions at one time when such an action would potentially be more destabilizing? As it is, Russia has had time to adapt piecemeal to the various sanction packages, at partially blunting their effect.

The second reason is that Russia appears to have been planning for sanctions for years before the invasion. They had stockpiled foreign exchange reserves likely figuring that they would be cut off for a time from the global financial system.

The third reason is that many of the larger powers such as China, but also India and Turkey, have not been fully cooperative with all of the sanctions, which means that Russia has not been as cut off or as isolated as western media and policymakers believed.

To be sure, the Russian economy has been damaged. Russian assertions that the economy is stronger than ever are largely propaganda. The sanctions are having some effect, and the Russian economy is not in a strong position. Russia has had to create various workarounds to get the parts/components that it needs; something that invariably increases the cost of those inputs. But we are not yet seeing empty store shelves in Moscow of the type that led to the Soviet Union’s collapse; something that would likely be necessary before economic pressure would cause Putin to stop the war.

5.)    Putin cannot afford to lose, making a negotiated peace with him unlikely.

Although Trump has been trying to negotiate some sort of deal to end the war, Putin doesn’t seem to be in any hurry. Part of this is likely a negotiating tactic (delay, refuse, and see what else your opponent will offer), but the other reason is the fact that any deal that leaves Ukraine in a position to resist Russian aggression will be seen as Putin having lost. While casualty numbers are falsified or overestimated (on both sides) for propaganda purposes, it would appear from the source Mediazone that at least 168,000 Russians can be confirmed killed in the last 4 years of war. Other sources put the number much higher, with some estimates of the killed and wounded reaching over 1 million. Add to this the fact that it appears that between 600,000 to 900,000 Russians have left since the invasion and not returned, and the Russian working-age male population (the most economically productive part of the population) has been measurably impacted.

The point is that Putin would be hard-pressed if he had to tell the Russian people that all of their sacrifices were for very little.  While he won’t necessarily be done for if he had to say that as much of the Moscow and St. Petersburg populations have been spared the impact of the war and the oligarchs are dependent on him (making them likely to support the current system regardless); Russian history has not been kind to rulers who lose wars. And in the case of Putin, losing power may not mean a comfortable retirement somewhere.

Conclusion:

The war has taught many lessons, including the limits of the reach of western power. While western countries (aka the U.S.) still have a lot of power and influence, the multipolarity that the war has revealed means that it can’t do everything that it wants. The war is still ongoing and there will likely be more surprises and revelations before it ends. However, despite the ongoing peace negotiations, the war does not appear to be close to ending, unless it is substantially on Russia’s term