Peace In Our Time?

With the war continuing to grind on, the Trump Administration is making another push to introduce a peace plan of some sort to stop the fighting in Ukraine. Although Russia is making indications about possibly agreeing to something, skepticism is warranted until the world sees concrete concessions of some sort from the Russian side. That being said, the plans that have been leaked have provoked resistance from Zelensky (who does seem amenable to something), and from the Europeans (who fear that Trump is giving away too much).

While the original 28 point plan (later reduced) that was leaked in late November has been criticized based on the fact that it apparently drew heavily from a Russian paper submitted in negotiations in October, the fact is that if Russia is going to end the war, their input is going to be necessary. The West can complain all it wants, but unless the U.S. or Europeans are willing to put troops on the ground in a shooting war with Russia and alter the dynamics on the battlefield that way (they are not), Russia is currently the stronger party on the battlefield. And as the (somewhat) stronger party, they are going to have a substantial say as to the conditions under which they will stop the fighting. This is not to say that the U.S. has no leverage. Russia is wanting the sanctions lifted, which means that the U.S. has something that Russia wants which provides some points of leverage. However, the dynamics are not ones where the U.S. and Europe can simply dictate peace terms that Russia has no choice but to accept.

As to the original 28 point plan (which is likely to be altered in the back and forth of negotiations), the two major points that have getting the most press are the limit on Ukrainian military forces to 600,000 troops and the evacuation of the Ukrainian troops out of the Donbass. These are rather large concessions as Ukraine currently has a military of roughly 900,000 active troops with reserves and paramilitary forces bringing the total number to 1 million. In addition, although Russian forces are still slowly advancing in Donbass, Ukraine still holds its fortress belt of cities, cities that they would evacuate as part of this peace deal. However, it currently appears that the evacuation of the fortress belt may no longer be on the table as is would give up a highly defensible position that Russia has been unable to take after years of war in exchange for what amounts to promises. 

The question is, as it has been for the last 2 years, is whether Ukrainian lines or the Russian economy collapses first. Although Russia has been advancing, it has been very slow and highly costly for them. And although the media has been focused on the battle of Pokrovsk, the fall of this city (which the Russians have been focused on for a year, if not longer) is not going to be strategically decisive. The loss of the fortress belt of cities, however, would be strategically decisive. Firstly, it would remove a major Ukrainian defensive system in this part of the front and put the Russians in a stronger position for if/when they decided to resume offensive operations against Ukraine, and secondly because it would give the Russians something that would likely take them years and tens of thousand of lives to obtain, if they could even accomplish it at all.

As for the limit on Ukrainian armed forces of 600,000, I don’t see this as necessarily a problem assuming Russia really did stop fighting for say 5 years. The reason is that 5 years would give the Ukrainians time to build out defensive works that could be held by 600,000 men. In addition, Ukraine now has a cadre of combat tested veterans that could theoretically be recalled to service in the event that the war started up again.

However, as with so much else in this war, the outcome depends on Russia. There is a case, a rather strong one, that Ukraine needs a deal more than Russia does. Right now, the war is one of attrition and the simple math says that Russia wins simply because it has more men to lose than Ukraine does. Some analysts point out that Russia’s advances are slow, costly and it could take years to obtain the land through force that they are being offered in negotiations. That is true if things continue as they have been. However, there are many cases in military history where one side’s advances were excruciatingly slow and costly and then, suddenly, the opponents defensive lines collapsed and advances thought to take years are accomplished in a couple of weeks/months.

What we don’t know is how close to this point of collapse are the Ukrainians. What we also don’t know is how close to some sort of major crisis is the Russian economy. The true indication will be how many real concrete concessions the Russians are willing to make. If they won’t do anything serious such as a cease fire (concrete) and a reduction (although not elimination) of military forces in the occupied areas (also concrete), then they may not feel that they are at a point where economic difficulties or high casualties will trigger a crisis at home for the regime. Putin needs something that he can sell to the public as a win; otherwise, he looks weak (a potentially physically fatal perception for a Russian leader).

This fact will makes it virtually certain that Russia will continue the war.

As for the plans that are being discussed, one positive aspect is that it does appear to be attempting to address multiple issues (such as arms control) and not just Ukraine. It’s possible that the apparent willingness of Russia to accept a Ukrainian army of 600,000 is a concession (they likely would rather Ukraine not have an army) which could indicate increasing Russian economic strain. However, Trump’s apparent eagerness for a deal could also be interpreted as weakness from the Russian perspective.

What isn’t clear is how badly Russia needs a deal. This being said, with the Donbass fortress belt of cities apparently off the table, we should know the answer to this question fairly quickly. If Russia continues serious negotiations, then the likelihood is relatively high that they are in some sort of economic difficulty and that time is running out for them to repair the damage. If they refuse to negotiate seriously, then they likely are not yet feeling the pressure.

The idea that the West has been pushing for nearly 4 years is that Ukraine must win and that borders must not be allowed to be changed by force. Unfortunately, the reality that is being confronted is that Ukraine simply doesn’t have the manpower or the resources to significantly reverse Russian gains, let alone return to the 1991 borders. Having the Ukrainians hold on, allowing themselves to be ground down while hoping that Russia’s economy collapses (thereby forcing Putin to sue for peace) is not really a strategy. It’s more of a hope and prayer, rather than a solid basis on which to form policy. While perhaps not a good deal from Ukraine’s perspective, a deal that allows an independent Ukraine to exist even in a reduced form (assuming that actually happens) should probably be seen as a positive. Putin wanted all of Ukraine. A deal that stops the fighting with him short of this goal and with Ukraine still holding defensible territory along with the port of Odessa can likely be seen as a win. And at this point, a scenario such as this may be the best that Ukraine can hope for.