Military Outlook For Russia

As talk of negotiations between Trump and Putin are starting to dominate the airwaves, it becomes useful to review the military situation from the perspectives of the two sides. The last 3 years have brought changes to the battlefield that will influence tactics in future wars around the world. At the same time, it has revealed some things specifically about the Russian military that could impact the negotiating position of the Russian side.

The first item to note is that the Russian military has seriously underperformed what Putin appears to have thought that it would be able to do in February of 2022. He, and most other analysts around the world, expected a quick Russian victory that would, if not erase Ukraine from the map, at least install a nominally independent puppet regime in Kiev. That did not happen and was in large part a function of operational failures of the Russian army. The Russian army, like the Soviet Army out of which it grew, is not tactically flexible much above the small unit level. Its main idea in WWI, WWII, and in this war has been to launch wave attacks of men and armored vehicles to try and break through enemy lines. Initially in this war, these tactics on a large scale were hampered by a weak Russian logistical system that was unable to manage the needs of multiple large offensives over wide sections of the front. In addition, the Russian lack of junior officers, which are plentiful in western armies, means that decisions on what to do are delayed as information is relayed up the chain of command and orders come back down. When action is finally taken, often the situation on the ground has shifted and the orders may or may not still be relevant. These factors became apparent at the beginning of the war. While the Russian Army has used some work arounds such as having generals operating closer to front line (where a few of them have been killed), and having smaller, but more numerous, supply depots closer to the front to shorten logistical supply chains and at the same time reduce the amount of supplies destroyed in any given Ukrainian strike, they have not been able to significantly improve their capabilities after 3 years of war to a level that would allow them to fundamentally alter the military situation.

Perhaps the biggest impacts on the war have been the improvement and expansion of drone capabilities, coupled with missile and anti-missile technology on both sides. What has happened from the Russian perspective is that the Ukrainian drone operators have been able to create a situation in which it becomes largely impossible for Russia to be able to mass large numbers of men and armored vehicles for a large offensive such as what they did at the beginning of the war. Ukraine has been able to strike at oil refineries, airbases, supply depots, as well as some troop concentrations. This is not to say that Russia is helpless. They have improved their drone & missile technology both to protect their own assets (Ukraine is not able to attack Russian targets at will), and also to successfully attack Ukrainian targets with drones and missiles. However, in order to be able to launch a massive offensive that would break through the Ukrainian lines and allow Putin to accomplish his initial goals of erasing the Ukrainian state as it currently exists, current Russian doctrine indicates that they would have to be able to mass tens of thousands of troops, along with hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, as well as the logistical support network to sustain the offensive in the initial phases as well as after the break-through. To accomplish this, Russia would have to dominate the skies over Ukraine (or at least a large section of the front) with drones, planes, missiles, and anti-missile/anti-drone technology to both largely hide their preparations and prevent Ukraine from harassing or disrupting the movement of military assets. Russia at the current time simply does not have this level of superiority, nor does it appear likely to achieve it at any time in the relatively near future.

Over the last year, Russia has attempted to create the appearance of success, and they have captured some additional territory. The Russian military has at least partially responded to its weaknesses and has launched small unit infantry assaults at various points, backed by drones and artillery assets. The advantage of these is that small groups can move quickly to seize certain positions and avoid (or limit the effectiveness) of Ukraine drone/ air assets. With the weight of large numbers of troops and these tactics, Russia has been able to capture some additional territory in 2024.

However, the downside to these tactics is that without large armored support which Ukrainian drones currently seem to be hindering, the success of these tactics is going necessarily to be limited to the immediate position(s) the local Russian troops are attacking on a given day. There does not appear to be a way at this time for large numbers of Russian troops/tanks to break through and move quickly enough (World War II-style) to surround and cut off large numbers of Ukrainian troops in strategic towns (such as Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast), which would be the only way to meaningfully shift the strategic military situation in Russia’s favor. And so, we have what we have seen over the last year, which is that Russia’s numerically larger military force grinds slowly forward capturing territory, but at what appears to be a high cost in casualties.

Whether Russia can continue to sustain apparently high losses for limited battlefield gains politically speaking is the primary question facing Putin right now. The fact that he is pulling in North Korean soldiers to fight in Kursk (with also apparently high casualties and limited success) is an indication that he does not believe that he can mobilize the entirety of Russian society World War II-style for this war. The fact that the Russian military has been increasing payments/bonuses to recruits is one indication that Russian society does not see this as the Great Patriotic War Part II. It is also an indication that wages and salaries throughout the Russian economy are increasing, giving prospective recruits other lucrative (less potentially lethal) options for earning a living. While much has been talked about regarding Russia’s ability with its larger population to sustain a war of attrition (a very real advantage), it is not clear that this advantage is as great might be assumed. In a long war of attrition, the side with the larger population base still needs to be able to get that population on to the battlefield in order for this to have an impact. In order to do this, the population needs to be motivated, enticed, or threatened to join the military and go to war. In order for the first two factors to work, the population has to broadly believe in the war to such an extent that they are willing to make significant sacrifices for victory. For the last factor to work over time, the population needs to feel either that it has no other options and/or that the war is existential. While certainly hard to tell, it isn’t clear that the Russian people believe in the war to the level needed nor that the Russian state is capable of threatening millions of additional men on to the battlefield. Whatever the truth, Putin’s actions do not appear to indicate that he believes that Russian society is behind the war to the level necessary to carry out mass-mobilization that would bring Russia’s larger population on to the battlefield where it might eventually have a strategic impact. And while Putin might not care about high casualties, at some level he likely understands that any society’s toleration for such things is not unlimited. And if society is pushed too far, an apparently strong and secure leader can suddenly and quickly find himself staring at the wrong end of rifle.

Summary:

 To sum up, the Russian military outlook is that of a sort of flexible stalemate. Russia is showing the capability of slowly capturing territory, but at an apparently high cost. The fact that Ukrainian troops were able to hold some Russian territory in Kursk for more than 6 months after the incursion is evidence of the currently limited Russian capability. The fact that Russia is importing North Korean troops and increasing payments to Russians willing to join the army is also revealing a constraint in Russia’s ability to mobilize its larger population on to the battlefield, where it could potentially have a strategic impact despite the Russian military’s still not insubstantial logistical and tactical shortcomings. And whatever one thinks of Putin, his actions appear to indicate that he has some appreciation for the current military outlook, even if he might not have 3 years ago.

Russia appears strong enough to hang on to most, if not all, of what it has captured in this war. Without some radical changes (and general mobilization), it does not currently appear capable of capturing an amount of territory that would significantly alter the overall strategic military situation in its favor.