With Europe now closing in on the 3rd anniversary of war on its soil, many will be reflecting on the lessons that can be drawn after all of this time. While the global media and talking heads have been commenting, confidently predicting, and often pushing the narrative of their preferred side, other observers have been taking note of the many factors that are being revealed. This war has changed many perceptions that existed prior, and have reinforced others. Whatever the ultimate outcome of this war, it is of the sort that will contribute to a shift in geopolitical relationships as well as the political landscape within many countries. In addition, this war has changed the shape of how wars are fought, and the tactics that will need to employed in future conflicts. Unlike the U.S. war in Afghanistan, Korea, Vietnam or the First Gulf War in 1991, this war may prove to be one of the most influential over the coming decades.
Some of the observations from the last 3 years are as follows:
1.) The Russian military is not nearly as effective as had been believed.
After its questionable performance in the 2008 war against Georgia, Russia embarked upon a 15-year military modernization program. Unfortunately for them, it did not bring them the result that they expected when they invaded Ukraine. The weaknesses initially centered on a failure to master the complex relationship that logistics support for a major armored offensive thrust required. Russian aviation was unable to achieve total air superiority as Ukraine was eventually able to create an aerial defense umbrella using missiles that, while not foolproof, has for 3 years prevented the Russians from obtaining a level of aerial superiority such as that enjoyed by the Americans in the Gulf in 1991 and 2003; a factor that allowed them to destroy Sadaam Hussein’s armies very quickly. The result has been a grinding, slow-moving capture of territory at what appears to be a frightening cost in Russian casualties.
2.) The Russians were better prepared economically than what Western analysts had thought.
After the initial invasion, the massive wave of sanctions was supposed to collapse the Russian economy and force Putin to abandon his ambitions in Ukraine. It didn’t happen, in large part because the Russian state had been building up reserves for years in preparation for just such an act. While I suspect that Putin likely felt that he had more influence over Europe due to Russian gas exports that could be cut off, he was apparently not banking on only that. The Russians have managed to actually achieve some growth in large part due to the shift to a war economy, as well as the fact that China, India, and some in what is known as the Global South have not been completely onboard with Russian sanctions, and have taken the opportunity to forge beneficial deals with Russia for themselves. Having said this, while China and India have continued trade relations with Russia, they have shown themselves not to be completely immune to U.S. pressure. Indications are that Chinese banks have been wary regarding who they are doing business with in Russia, and appear to be trying to make sure that they do not fall afoul of U.S. sanctions. While Russia has done better than expected, inflation, labor shortages, and a centralized decision-making apparatus that prioritizes government control over economic dynamism are creating major challenges. While the Russian economy has grown through fiscal stimulus and war expenditures, the effects of this are temporary and likely cannot be sustained long-term. In terms of the economy, time is likely not on Russia’s side.
3.) The boundaries of U.S. influence.
In 2022, it appears that western policy-makers had not fully appreciated that the unipolar moment that the U.S. enjoyed in the late 1990s had passed. The western narrative that massive sanctions would collapse the Russian economy and either force a negotiated settlement or allow Ukraine to beat up on a supply-starved Russian army assumed that the world would fall in line with the U.S. And if this had been 1992, the world likely would have done exactly that.
However, the world did not simply fall in line with U.S. & European desires. China, as expected, refused to cut off Russia completely. But even Turkey, India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (among others) continued to work with Russia causing sanctions to be less effective than they would otherwise be. Currently, the U.S. has not seen fit to go into a global trade war to get these countries to behave as it would like. However, this might be changing as the Trump Administration appears willing to use trade policy as a stick to coerce behavior out of certain countries. The perceived boundaries of U.S. influence may be due in part to a reluctance by the prior Administration of using all tools at its disposal. Only time will tell. Regardless, the fact that U.S. must be more aggressive to get the behavior that it wants is an indication that its influence is weaker than it was 25 years ago, even if cheerleaders for alternative organizations such as BRICs tend to overstate their effectiveness.
4.) The European political class appears too small for the current moment.
Over the last 75+ years since the founding of NATO (Western Europe) and 35+ years since the fall of the Soviet Union (Eastern Europe) Europeans have been living in a world in which they didn’t need think too much about war, especially since 1990. With the exception of the UK and France (and possibly a case could be made for Italy) none of Europe’s countries have fielded militaries capable of projecting significant military power outside of their own national borders. European leaders have been content to let the U.S. handle Europe’s defense needs, while they focused on building out their generous social-welfare states. Wars had become an anachronism leading one enthusiast of the European project to declare that Europe had built and area where war had been completely ruled out. Despite cajoling and urging from multiple U.S. Administrations from both parties to meet the defense spending guideline of 2% of their GDP, as of 2021 only 6 out of the 32 NATO countries did. In short, the Europeans did not take defense seriously.
The good news is that now 23 out 32 countries meet this standard. However, that 2% guideline is something of a baseline to maintain a certain level of defensive capabilities. Simply arriving at 2% does not undo decades of neglect of military matters. While a good start, the present moment requires a complete overhaul of strategic thinking, not merely pushing defense spending to baseline that was agreed to 19 years ago when NATO was not really facing any threats. Currently according to Al Jazeera, only 5 countries (U.S., Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Greece) are above the 3% hurdle, an indication that many still do not take the need for a rapid increase in European defense capabilities seriously.
In the 3 years since the start of the war, Europeans should have made a serious start in building out its defense industrial capacity with the goal of creating massive quantities of European-made weapons, including tanks, drones, aircraft, artillery shells, etc. This process appears to have commenced sluggishly at best even at this late date. The European political class has existed in some sort of a bubble for 2 or 3 generations. It largely does not appear to have fully grasped how the world has changed.
The elite currently running Europe seem wedded to the practice of diplomatic discussion, press conferences, bold statements, and policy fudges. This sort of muddling through was acceptable when there was no serious danger on the horizon and seriousness was optional, but it is completely unsuited world in which there is a hostile power on one’s border. Europe’s elite does not seem to have modified its practices to reflect this new reality.
Conclusion:
There are many other lessons that can be learned, and subsequent essays will focus on the battlefield lessons as they have developed over the last 3 years. However, the ones mentioned here are significant, and will impact how the situation evolves and how the world that comes after the war is organized. Wars with far reaching impacts, as this one appears to be, are often very unforgiving to poor decisions and those individuals/institutions that make them. The geopolitical world in a few years has a decent chance of not being recognizable to someone from 2018 or 2019.
And this war is likely to be a significant cause of these changes.
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