As the fall season in Ukraine proceeds forward with Russian forces advancing slowly in certain areas and a new American administration on the horizon, the situation in Ukraine continues to be unclear. If the last two-and-a-half years should have taught us anything, it’s that predictions as to where things are going are difficult to make. While Russian forces are moving forward that the weight of sheer numbers is apparently beginning to tell in certain parts of the front, there are still some questions regarding how quickly Russia can replace its losses. Now that Donald Trump is headed back to the White House, there is also a big question mark as to what impact a change in U.S. Administration is going to have on events as well. Personally, I believe the following factors will be key moving forward.
Russian Resupply & Logistics:
As with all wars, resupply & logistics are going to be key factors. The initial Russian invasion was undone in large part due to a failure of the Russian military to master the logistical needs of an armored offensive. Although Russian forces are advancing, they appear to be doing so under heavy losses. Some estimates have put Russian casualties at roughly 80,000 over the two months September/October. While errors and wishful thinking in these estimates cannot be ruled out, the fact that Russia is putting North Korean troops into the line is an indication that Russia is having difficulty generating combat troops in sufficient numbers to adequately replace their losses quickly. In addition, Russia appears to have lost a significant amount of heavy equipment, and appears to be losing it at a higher rate than what its industrial base can replace. While Russia started the war with significant reserves of Soviet tanks and armored vehicles, the war in Ukraine has forced the Russian military to dip into these reserves. It is not clear how much they have left after almost 3 years of combat operations. At some point, losses will force Russia to either scale back combat operations, and/or come to some sort of negotiated settlement. The big question is whether the Ukrainian lines will break before this point is reached.
To increase combat power, some Russian nationalists are urging the Kremlin to call for a general mobilization to raise sufficient troops that would eventually be able to overwhelm the Ukrainian lines. Putin is clearly reluctant to do this. This is an indication that despite what public polls may say, the Russian public may not be as supportive of the war when it comes to sacrificing their own sons for it. While a general mobilization followed quick successful end to the war would likely boost Putin and reinforce his government, a mobilization that saw large numbers of Russian conscripts being slaughtered in fields of Ukraine could very well result in the end of Putin.
Going forward, look for Putin to continue as he has for 3 years, which is to avoid general mobilization and try to figure out ways to boost manpower in other ways, such as North Korean combat troops.
Russian Tactics:
Probably the largest single reason that the Russian casualty figures are so high is that Russia does not appear to have been able to fundamentally change its tactics at the large unit level. At the small unit/platoon level, it does appear that Russian forces are able to engage in tactically flexible operations similar to what a Western army might do. While these tactics allow for some marginal territorial gains, they don’t allow for massive break-throughs that would allow Russian forces to take large swaths of territory significant enough to have a strategic impact on the war. Currently, Putin appears to be banking on continuing to make small tactical gains indefinitely, figuring that enough small tactical gains over time will add up to a large strategic gain. This is not an unreasonable plan, assuming the current scale of offensive operations can be maintained, a rather large ‘if’.
At the large unit level, Russian forces do not appear to have been able to modify their tactics much beyond how Russia has historically fought wars. That is to say, their tactics have roughly been human wave (or armored wave) attacks that have relied on overwhelming the defender with numbers. This was how they fought in WWI, WWII, and how they are largely fighting today. Tactics like this are often bloody and very costly in terms of lives and equipment, and they put a large strain on one’s logistics and resupply system. Whether Russia is able to achieve a breakthrough before its tactics deplete its reserves is one of the key questions of this war.
A New U.S. Administration:
The return of Donald Trump to the White House will have a significant effect on how this war plays out. Despite Trump’s boasting on the campaign trail, this war will not end in 24 hours after he takes office. And while some may see him as a friend of Putin, I personally think that fears of this are likely overblown. Whatever else he is, I find it unlikely that he wants to go down in history as the guy who lost Ukraine to Russia. At the same time, it’s unlikely that he wants American soldiers engaged in combat with Russian troops inside Ukraine. I would expect a Trump Administration to take a more realistic view of the situation, which is that short of American forces on the ground, there is no way that Crimea is returned to Ukraine. In addition, it is likely that Ukraine lacks the combat capacity to retake any significant territory in the foreseeable future without direct involvement of U.S. combat troops. What I do expect is that Trump will try and come up with some sort of deal to end the war, or at least some sort of ceasefire along the current front lines. While some may worry, not unreasonably, that he will cut off aid to Kiev, I suspect that threat is likely to be used to get Kiev to talk with Russia. The fact that it appears that some in the Ukrainian government were actually hoping for a Trump victory indicates that whatever they are expecting from him, it isn’t that he cuts off Kiev and leaves them to their fate.
Of course, what isn’t clear is whether Putin is willing to negotiate in good faith. It seems that he may not be; especially with Russian forces currently advancing. He may think that he is winning, and so why would he negotiate when he can see a path to getting everything he wants? In this case, Trump might actually go full force, actually increase aid to Kiev and pull off any restrictions on their use of weaponry with the idea of forcing Putin to negotiating table. Whether this tactic would work remains to be seen. While Trumps’ return to the White House is unlikely to be without significant impact on this war, what that impact is will only be known in hindsight after events have played out.
Conclusion:
If the last nearly 3 years of war have shown anything, it is that the predictions of military and political experts have not proven to be especially accurate. War is a human activity more heavily laden with uncertainty than most activities that humans engage in. What is going to tell how this war ends is whether Russia can replenish its manpower and equipment to maintain its pace of operations. For the West, defeating Russia isn’t just an issue of destroying supply hubs and interdicting supply routes through bombings and artillery strikes (as important as these are), but also impairing their ability to produce new munitions. Western sanctions have been focused on precisely this. And while the sanctions have not eliminated Russia’s ability to produce new munitions as was originally hoped, they have constrained it somewhat. Over time, this can have (and likely is currently having) an effect of reducing (although not eliminating) Russia’s ability to wage war. That sanctions have not had the effect that was advertised in collapsing Russia’s economy doesn’t mean that they not reducing Russia’s options relative to what they would be in the absence of sanctions.
And of course, how the war proceeds will depend on the Trump Administration and whether it is able to come up with some sort of a deal that Putin can’t refuse.
Only time will tell.
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